
On November 14, 1969, three astronauts climbed aboard a Saturn V rocket with the entirely reasonable expectation that NASA would send them to the Moon. They had trained for equipment failures, navigation emergencies, and the many creative ways a spacecraft might attempt to ruin everyone’s day. They had not, however, planned on having their rocket struck by lightning.
Thirty-six and a half seconds after liftoff, lightning hit Apollo 12. Sixteen seconds later, it happened again. Warning lights illuminated, electrical equipment dropped offline, and the instruments in Mission Control began reporting figures that seemed to have been generated by a malfunctioning bingo machine. Meanwhile, the rocket continued roaring upward, apparently unaware that its passengers were having a rather different experience.
Then a young flight controller named John Aaron offered a solution so obscure that even his flight director needed it repeated: “SCE to AUX.” The instruction would reach the spacecraft as “Try SCE to auxiliary,” but the shorter version would become famous. Three cryptic words, one switch, and a remarkable amount of accumulated human ingenuity stood between Apollo 12 and a very embarrassing change of plans. The really interesting question is not what those letters meant. It is why Aaron knew to say them at precisely the moment everybody else was trying to determine which disaster they were dealing with.
Contents
The Follow-Up to the Greatest Moon Landing in History
Four months earlier, Apollo 11 had put Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin on the lunar surface, accomplishing what had recently seemed like a particularly ambitious science-fiction plot. Apollo 12 faced a less glamorous challenge: do it again, preferably with improved accuracy and considerably fewer surprises. The second lunar landing had to demonstrate that reaching the Moon was becoming a repeatable operation rather than an extraordinary coincidence.

The crew consisted of commander Charles “Pete” Conrad, command module pilot Richard “Dick” Gordon, and lunar module pilot Alan Bean. Conrad and Gordon had flown together on Gemini 11. Bean was making his first trip into space, which is quite an introduction to the profession even without a supplementary electrical demonstration courtesy of Mother Nature.
Their destination was the Ocean of Storms, a name that sounds suspiciously like a location in a Percy Jackson novel. In 1967, the robotic Surveyor 3 spacecraft had landed there, and Apollo 12 was supposed to touch down nearby so Conrad and Bean could retrieve components that scientists could examine after more than two years of exposure to the lunar environment.
In other words, humanity was traveling a quarter-million miles through space to collect somebody else’s abandoned equipment. When we consider some of the other things humanity would end up leaving on the Moon, including bags of human waste, the astronauts got off rather lightly. At least retrieving an old television camera didn’t require rubber gloves, a strong stomach, and a very long pair of tongs.
The spacecraft sat atop a Saturn V, a three-stage rocket roughly 363 feet tall. Its first stage produced about 7.5 million pounds of thrust, a figure that sounds more reassuring before one remembers that the entire arrangement depends on extraordinarily complicated machinery behaving itself for several consecutive minutes. And as readers of our earlier account of Apollo 12’s wandering third stage already know, parts of this particular rocket would continue finding ways to make news decades later.
NASA Discovers That Thunderstorms Have Not Read the Flight Plan
Launch morning at Kennedy Space Center was wet, cloudy, and generally more appropriate for staying indoors with a cup of coffee than for leaving the planet. A weather front had passed through Florida. The sky was overcast, and rain had complicated the countdown preparations, but the conditions did not violate the launch restrictions then in effect. Nobody had decided that lightning was an acceptable accessory to human spaceflight; NASA simply had not fully appreciated what a rocket could do to the electrical environment around it.

President Richard Nixon was among those watching. This made Apollo 12 the sort of public spectacle in which a technical malfunction could have massive career consequences for an entire agency of the federal government. Fortunately, the Saturn V lifted off from Pad 39A on schedule at 11:22 a.m. Eastern time.
For approximately 36 seconds, things looked splendid. The massive rocket climbed into the clouds while the crew monitored its progress. Then, at an altitude of roughly 6,000 feet, a lightning bolt flashed along the ascending vehicle. The rocket and its electrically conductive exhaust plume helped trigger the discharge. The spacecraft had effectively joined forces with the atmosphere to become a gigantic, extremely expensive lightning rod.
Conrad noticed a flash. Inside the capsule, alarm indicators sprang to life. The three fuel cells supplying the command and service module’s normal electrical power disconnected from the main power buses, leaving batteries to carry the load. The lights did not communicate the subtle message that there might be a minor adjustment worth considering. They suggested that multiple important systems had suddenly developed deeply held objections to continued employment.
Then Lightning Struck Twice
At 52 seconds after liftoff, another electrical disturbance struck Apollo 12. This time the command module’s primary inertial guidance platform lost its reference. One of the attitude displays began rotating wildly, as if the spacecraft’s instruments had decided to interpret the launch as an interpretive dance. Gordon and Bean worked to determine what remained operational while Conrad tried to make sense of the warning panel.
The situation was dangerous, but it was not quite the total catastrophe the displays implied. The Saturn V had a separate guidance system in its Instrument Unit, located below the spacecraft, and that system continued directing the booster. Apollo 12 was still following a proper flight path. The astronauts also retained communications and usable backup attitude information. These were substantial blessings, although they came with the small inconvenience of not knowing whether the rest of the spacecraft was about to give up.
In Houston, flight director Gerry Griffin and his controllers faced an almost perversely difficult problem. The crew reported an apparent electrical emergency, yet the numbers arriving at Mission Control made little sense. NASA had people trained to diagnose fuel cells, batteries, power distribution, and hundreds of other systems. Unfortunately, much of the information needed to diagnose those systems had itself become unreliable.
It is rather like calling a mechanic because your car has stopped running, only to discover that every instrument on the dashboard now reports a different recipe for banana bread. We have no professional objection to banana bread, but this is not the moment for it.
The Young Man Watching the Wrong-Looking Numbers

One of the controllers was John W. Aaron, a young engineer serving at the EECOM console. The acronym originally stood for Electrical, Environmental, and Communications, although by Apollo 12 most communications responsibilities had been transferred to a separate controller. Aaron’s job centered on the spacecraft’s electrical power, environmental controls, and life-support systems. In a room filled with specialists, his particular responsibility was to understand systems that nobody wanted to think about until one of them stopped behaving.
Aaron’s monitors were displaying bizarre figures rather than the expected readings. To most observers, those numbers were evidence that something had gone badly wrong. To Aaron, they were something else: familiar. He had seen that particular sort of nonsense before, and, crucially, he remembered why.
The Night Shift That Accidentally Prepared Someone to Save Apollo 12
During an earlier ground test of an Apollo command module at Kennedy Space Center, Aaron had been monitoring operations from Houston during a third shift. A mistake in the test sequence caused the spacecraft’s electrical supply to change to battery power. That was an inconvenience, not a lunar emergency. The operators corrected the configuration, and normal business resumed.
One detail, however, bothered Aaron. Instead of showing zero when power was interrupted, certain telemetry values became peculiar, apparently arbitrary numbers. This was not what the training simulations had taught controllers to expect. Most people would have filed the experience under “equipment acted weird” and continued with the evening.
Aaron did not let it go. He thought about the numbers on his way home, then returned the next morning and worked through the circuitry with a North American Aviation engineer named Dick Brown. Together they investigated why those readings had appeared and traced the behavior to the Signal Conditioning Equipment, or SCE. Under the affected power conditions, the equipment could send misleading information rather than useful measurements.
The investigation also revealed a way around the problem. The SCE had an auxiliary power supply that could be selected if its normal supply stopped functioning properly. Switching to AUX allowed the equipment to draw power through that alternate circuit and resume producing usable data once sufficient voltage was available. Aaron learned not merely that a mysterious switch existed, but what kinds of symptoms indicated that using it might help. The difference would prove rather more important than a passing familiarity with a control-panel label.
Years later, Aaron explained in his January 2000 NASA oral history that he had recognized the pattern and remembered how to escape it. He did not claim to have instantly reconstructed every consequence of the lightning strikes. He knew a specific part of the data system was behaving in a way he had previously studied. It was an excellent example of the practical value of curiosity, particularly when the alternative is staring helplessly at a screen full of numbers that appear to have been selected by a committee of confused squirrels.
What in the World Is SCE to AUX?
The Signal Conditioning Equipment took electrical signals from sensors throughout the spacecraft and converted them into standardized forms that could be processed by the telemetry system. That allowed Mission Control to receive meaningful information about the spacecraft’s condition. Without reliable signal conditioning, the underlying equipment might be functioning perfectly well while the data describing it became useless or misleading. In other words, NASA had the technological equivalent of a patient whose medical monitors were reporting that his blood pressure was seven, his temperature was purple, and his pulse was somewhere in the vicinity of Cleveland.
The switch labeled SCE had a normal setting and an auxiliary setting. Selecting AUX switched the equipment to its alternate power supply, allowing it to function properly after the temporary voltage disturbance had disrupted its normal operation. It did not magically reconnect the fuel cells, remove damage from lightning, or restart the entire spacecraft. It restored reliable telemetry to Mission Control, which was the necessary first step toward determining what had actually gone wrong.
That is the important technical distinction behind the famous phrase. “SCE to AUX” was not the space-age equivalent of hitting the television until the picture returned. It was a specific response to an identifiable failure in the measurement system. Aaron knew the difference because, during a much less exciting test, he had bothered to find out.
Three Words Nobody Particularly Wanted to Hear Explained
At roughly a minute and a half into the flight, Griffin asked his controllers what they could tell him. Aaron’s recommendation came over the internal Mission Control communication loop: “Flight, EECOM. Try SCE to AUX.” Griffin asked him to repeat the unfamiliar instruction, and the exchange briefly became a discussion of precisely which obscure abbreviation everyone was supposed to understand. Griffin then passed the recommendation along to CapCom Gerald Carr, who had the unenviable responsibility of explaining it to three astronauts currently traveling at several thousand miles per hour.

CapCom Gerald Carr, the astronaut responsible for speaking directly to the crew, relayed the instruction at one minute and 36 seconds after liftoff: “Apollo 12, Houston. Try SCE to auxiliary. Over.” The recorded flight conversation reveals that Conrad initially misheard the instruction, repeating it as “FCE to Auxiliary.” He then turned to his crewmates and asked the entirely reasonable question, “What the hell is that?” Carr repeated the correct instruction a few seconds later. At this point, NASA’s multimillion-dollar communications network was functioning perfectly, even if the people using it were having some difficulty agreeing on which letters they were supposed to be communicating.
This strikes us as an entirely fair inquiry. Under ordinary circumstances, one might prefer to become acquainted with a switch before taking a seat on top of several million pounds of propellant. Under the circumstances, the crew had approximately no opportunity to organize a committee to examine the matter, circulate minutes, or schedule a follow-up meeting.
Fortunately, Alan Bean was sitting in front of the panel containing the SCE control. He knew where to find it and moved the switch to the auxiliary position. Gordon, meanwhile, was occupied with the surviving backup guidance information. The familiar simplified version of the story has Bean as the one astronaut who knew the switch existed; the actual flight record shows a well-trained crew dividing its attention among several urgent tasks. Every one of those jobs mattered.
The effect of Bean’s action was swift. Coherent telemetry returned to Houston. What had looked like an indecipherable collection of electrical catastrophes became a problem the controllers could evaluate. The crew had not escaped every consequence of the strikes, but Mission Control had recovered one of its most powerful tools: the ability to distinguish an actual malfunction from a bad measurement.
Restoring the Readings Was Not the Same as Restoring the Spacecraft
Here is where a great story sometimes becomes a little too tidy in the retelling. Flipping the switch did not instantly reconnect Apollo 12’s electrical power system. The three fuel cells had been disconnected from the main buses, and the spacecraft was drawing power from batteries that were not intended to handle the entire job for an extended flight.
Once Aaron and his colleagues could trust the measurements again, they were able to determine what needed attention. Carr instructed the astronauts to reset the fuel cells shortly after the two-minute mark. The crew reconnected them, restoring the spacecraft’s normal electrical supply. This was the actual electrical recovery; the SCE switch had made a proper diagnosis possible.
There was still another problem. The command module’s inertial guidance platform had been upset by the second lightning strike. The astronauts could not simply declare it fixed because Houston’s displays were readable again. They continued into Earth orbit, where Gordon and the ground team worked to reestablish the platform’s orientation using the spacecraft’s optical equipment, star sightings, and updated navigation information.
Only after the crew and controllers thoroughly checked the systems could they approve the engine burn that would send Apollo 12 toward the Moon. The episode was therefore not one problem solved with one switch. It was a chain of problems handled in the proper order, starting with the unglamorous but indispensable task of obtaining trustworthy information.
Why Didn’t They Just Abort?
The obvious reaction to multiple electrical alarms immediately after liftoff might be to abandon the mission. After all, NASA had installed a launch escape system for the very good reason that a malfunctioning rocket can become an unpleasant place to spend one’s remaining seconds. But astronauts did not abort whenever an indicator displayed something discouraging. They followed carefully developed rules that distinguished failures requiring an immediate escape from problems that could be evaluated safely during ascent.
The Saturn V itself kept flying normally. Its separate navigation system continued guiding the rocket, the crew had electrical power from the batteries, and communications remained available. In his postflight comments, Conrad explained that he had not seriously considered an abort while those essentials were intact. His concern was that the spacecraft might reach orbit in an unhealthy condition, leaving everyone with a great deal of troubleshooting to do.
That is not the same as saying the incident was harmless. A failed backup supply, a more consequential guidance disturbance, or damage to a critical component could have produced a far worse outcome. It is simply inaccurate to picture the astronauts seconds from pushing an abort button until Aaron uttered a magic incantation. Their training, the launch vehicle’s independent systems, and several layers of redundancy were all buying them time.
Five Days Later, a Perfectly Respectable Moon Landing
Apollo 12 reached Earth orbit, completed its checks, and received permission to head for the Moon. On November 19, Conrad and Bean descended in the lunar module Intrepid, leaving Gordon to pilot the command module Yankee Clipper in lunar orbit. Their landing in the Ocean of Storms placed them within walking distance of Surveyor 3, an impressively precise achievement considering that their trip had begun with a double lightning strike.
When Neil Armstrong became the first human to step onto the Moon four months earlier, he marked the occasion with one of history’s most memorable declarations: “That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.” It was dignified, profound, and appropriately solemn for an event that represented the culmination of thousands of years of human curiosity and achievement.
When Pete Conrad prepared to become the third person to walk on the Moon, he took a somewhat different rhetorical approach. As he jumped from the lunar module’s ladder onto its footpad, he exclaimed, “Whoopee!” before adding, “Man, that may have been a small one for Neil, but that’s a long one for me.”
Conrad, who was considerably shorter than Armstrong, was referring to the distance between the ladder and the footpad. A few seconds later, he finally stepped onto the lunar surface itself and reported, “Oooh, is that soft and queasy.” After testing the ground beneath his boots, he offered another observation destined to occupy a somewhat less prominent position in the history books: “Hey, that’s neat.” Apparently, humanity’s second lunar landing was less an occasion for solemn declarations about the destiny of civilization and more an opportunity to discover that the Moon was, in fact, pretty neat.
We rather admire the contrast. Armstrong sounded like a man delivering a message on behalf of the entire human race. Conrad sounded like someone who had just discovered that the local coffee shop was offering an extra shot of espresso that day for no additional cost. Both reactions were entirely understandable, although we suspect NASA’s public affairs department was considerably more comfortable with Armstrong’s approach.
Conrad and Bean explored the lunar surface during two moonwalks, collected samples, installed scientific equipment, and visited the old robotic lander. They returned pieces of Surveyor 3 for examination, proving that the mission could do more than repeat Apollo 11’s triumph. It could travel to a particular place and carry out a planned program of scientific work. The Moon was becoming somewhere humanity could navigate rather than merely somewhere it could arrive.
Naturally, the universe was not finished providing opportunities for human error. While setting up a color television camera on the Moon, Bean accidentally pointed it at the Sun, damaging the camera’s sensitive tube and ending the planned live surface television coverage. Considering that he had already helped rescue the entire mission, we believe history can afford to forgive him for one regrettable decision involving a camera and the brightest object in the sky.
The Lightning Changed the Rules
NASA investigated how a rocket could be struck on a day that met the existing launch rules. The answer involved a danger that was not adequately covered by simply avoiding active thunderstorms. A large launch vehicle moving through an electrically charged cloud environment, especially with a conductive exhaust plume stretching behind it, could help initiate lightning that otherwise might not have occurred at that moment.
After Apollo 12, launch-weather procedures were tightened to account for conditions favoring triggered lightning, including electrically hazardous cloud formations rather than only visible storm activity. The modern lightning launch criteria reflect decades of work to distinguish apparently calm skies from skies that could make a departing rocket regret its ambitions.
The strikes also demonstrated something encouraging. The Saturn V’s own systems had survived without significant impairment, and the spacecraft’s redundancy gave the crew time to recover. Nine noncritical sensors were permanently disabled, so the episode was not entirely without damage. Fortunately, the affected measurements could be managed without jeopardizing the mission. The more consequential protections had worked, and the weaknesses exposed by the launch were studied rather than politely forgotten.
NASA’s Most Unlikely Kind of Superhero
John Aaron became associated with one of Mission Control’s more colorful compliments: “steely-eyed missile man.” It was an unofficial expression of enormous respect for people who could solve exceptionally difficult problems without losing their composure. As professional honors go, it sounds rather less bureaucratic than the sort of certificate usually presented at an office luncheon, which may explain its enduring popularity.
Aaron would later contribute to the response to Apollo 13’s electrical emergency, further strengthening his reputation. But his Apollo 12 achievement deserves to stand on its own. He did not design a revolutionary device in those critical seconds. He did not improvise a repair from a roll of tape and an office stapler. He recognized an unusual pattern and remembered an appropriate remedy because he had done the intellectual work before the emergency arrived.
This is also a useful corrective to the idea that every great NASA story belongs solely to astronauts and rocket scientists with famous names. The Apollo program depended on countless engineers, technicians, programmers, and controllers whose expertise could appear almost comically narrow until the instant it became indispensable. Some of the people responsible for getting humanity to the Moon were specialists in systems most of humanity had never heard of.
Interestingly, Aaron wasn’t the first unlikely hero to lend a hand during an Apollo mission. Just four months earlier, a ten-year-old boy named Greg Force helped keep Apollo 11’s communications network functioning during its return to Earth. When a tracking antenna on Guam developed a mechanical problem, Greg was recruited to squeeze his small arm into its machinery and apply grease where grown engineers couldn’t easily reach.
We are beginning to suspect that NASA’s success depended less on the collective genius of thousands of scientists than on having the right person available at precisely the right moment. In one case, it was a child with exceptionally small arms. In the other, it was a young engineer with an exceptionally good memory.
The Most Important Switch Is Sometimes the One Nobody Notices
The lesson of Apollo 12 is frequently summarized as the triumph of quick thinking. That is true, but incomplete. Quick thinking was only possible because Aaron had previously spent time thinking slowly and carefully about a problem that nobody was requiring him to investigate. During an ordinary test, he noticed an oddity. He asked why. He followed the answer into the circuitry. Months later, the same peculiar pattern appeared at precisely the wrong time and in precisely the right person’s field of view.
There was luck involved, and Aaron freely acknowledged it. The earlier test could have gone normally. He could have ignored the strange numbers. Someone else could have been assigned to his console on launch day. Bean could have had trouble finding the switch. The Saturn V’s guidance system could have failed. Several fortunate circumstances had to align, but luck alone did not explain why Aaron was prepared to take advantage of them.
We would like to claim that Commonplace Fun Facts is similarly devoted to investigating every strange detail, but this might oblige us to finish examining the printer that has displayed “Replace Cartridge” since 2023. For now, we shall settle for admiring a young engineer who saw nonsense on a screen, refused to stop at “that’s odd,” and eventually used what he learned to help send three men to the Moon.
Sometimes history turns on a great speech, an extraordinary invention, or a decision made by someone whose name is already in the textbooks. And sometimes it turns on three seemingly incomprehensible words, remembered by one flight controller, relayed through Mission Control, and acted upon by an astronaut who knew where to find the right switch. It was not the most dramatic demonstration of human ingenuity in the history of space exploration, but it was certainly among the most effective.
SCE to AUX. Not a bad return on one evening’s curiosity.
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